After two deadly crashes in the past six years that killed 346 people, followed by a 21-month global grounding of aircraft and a mid-air door exploding on a Max aircraft, the 108-year-old flagship aerospace company is grappling with the biggest crisis of its life — including possible criminal charges by the U.S. Justice Department. The old slogan “If it ain't Boeing, I won't go” has become a distant memory, at least for now.
Amid belatedly heightened oversight by the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as a result of the Max crashes, Boeing is working hard to win back trust. It recently opened the doors of its single (737) and twin (777) aisle FLA in Seattle to a cross-section of the world’s media, including TOI. The senior management there admitted lapses in recent years, while assuring that corrective steps would be taken. Process heads spoke of bringing back checks and balances that had been eliminated in an effort to get planes ready quickly.
Clearly, a lot of work will have to be done to regain confidence. Several aerospace industry insiders who worked for or with Boeing in the US said the focus has shifted from engineering excellence to financial performance over the past few years. “I was with a supply chain partner and we were constantly told to cut corners to reduce our supply costs. After a point, it became difficult to work with Boeing,” said one engineer in San Francisco, who asked not to be named.
The final blow came with the recent MAX scare – the explosion in the door plug of an Alaska Air B737-9 MAX in the US on January 5, 2024. Boeing's senior vice president (quality) Elizabeth Lund says the company's first reaction was to “take immediate action to make sure that no airplanes headed to our factory could have an accident. I'll tell you that very transparently.”
He gave a detailed list of steps taken to improve safety, including basics such as clarifying required work in plain English; end-of-line inspections for critical systems; ensuring that unfinished work in process does not move to the next stage of the FLA; increasing workforce training; eliminating defects and ensuring 100% adherence to safety and quality management systems.
He said, “We knew we had to solve problems related to the system. The first problem is workforce experience. We have hired a lot of employees since COVID and the timing coincides with the timing of the MAX grounding (March 2019-December 2020). We didn't actually do involuntary layoffs, but we were not able to bring them (many of those who left) back. When we came out of the MAX grounding, we were flying again. We were coming out of COVID and the market came back incredibly fast at that time. We were hiring a lot of people in a short period of time (many) who had little experience. (And) in many cases, no aerospace experience. Our manufacturing plans are complicated at times. Especially for a new employee who has no aerospace experience. Maybe they speak English as a second language, (making things) even more complicated.”
Elizabeth Lund (Image courtesy: Saurabh Sinha)
Boeing then started moving from “engineering English” to “more clear” English using artificial intelligence. So instead of saying Boeing wants a 0.375 (unit of measurement) hole plus or minus 0.05, it now says the hole should be between 0.356 and 0.393. Many newcomers were found to “struggle doing the job correctly”. So Boeing says it has improved its baseline training and linked it to proficiency testing.
A key challenge for leadership is keeping workforce morale high as it tries to win back the world's confidence in its planes. “We are human beings and we are affected by what has unfortunately happened in recent days,” said one technician on the Max assembly line. Katie Ringgold, vice president of the 737 program and Renton site leader, made a plea to the media during a shop floor visit, “Keep the tough questions for me and leadership (and don't put them to the technicians out there).”
Jason Clark, vice president and general manager of the B777 program and Everett site leader, said employee involvement (EI) — where workers regularly discuss production issues — was brought back a month ago. “It was removed because there was too much overlap. By doing that, we lost the mechanic’s voice. Now we have re-formed groups for mechanics to discuss and fix problems,” Clark said.
The increased focus on safety and scrutiny means the FAA has asked Boeing to produce far fewer than the 38 approved B737 MAX per month. Customer airlines, including Air India Express and Akasa, do not know what the delivery schedule of their ordered MAXs will be. Production of the popular Dreamliner (B787), assembled at an FLA in Charleston, South Carolina, has also been affected. The production schedule in Charleston has been slowed for stability due to supply chain issues. The firm focus is on FE and processes. We will increase the rate over the next few years and return to five 787s per month later in 2024,” said Scott Stocker, VP and GM B787 program and South Carolina site leader.
After the Indonesian Lion Air B737 MAX crash in October 2018; after the Ethiopian B737 MAX crash in March 2019, these planes were grounded globally. They were allowed to fly again in December 2020 after Boeing assured it had taken all necessary corrective actions. Then there was a door plug blowout on a US carrier this January.
Asked why one should believe Boeing really has it all to build safe planes, Lund admitted he gets asked this question often. “After the Max crashes we took (several) positive steps. We created a separate organization focused on safety. Just a few days (after) I took over. There were various levels of internal audits focused on quality for our production system… We are a company fully committed to flight safety, public safety and our employees. I believe the (current) plan will make us even stronger. We are transparent with you (the media), with ourselves regulators And our customers. We have opened our factories to our customers so they can come. The regulator has access to all of our data. There is no hidden agenda. There is no hidden data. We are a transparent company that cares deeply about safety and the public and our employees and we are committed to getting better every day,” Lund tried to reassure.
“We have been dedicated to making air transport as safe as humanly possible for years and will continue to do so. I believe the steps we have taken over the years have made air transport the safest mode of transport. We have taken steps to address (safety issues) and will continue to do so,” he said.
Boeing says it used the Alaska Air door plug-out to “take a step back, look at everything holistically and be very introspective. To see what else can we do? How can we make sure our systems are as fully robust as possible. So we started gathering input from a number of sources.” Boeing received more than 30,000 ideas, pain points and areas of improvement across the board, in addition to instructions from FAA auditors, which are the “primary basis” of a plan to make planes safe again.
“How do we make sure we can build a great airplane? First is to invest in workforce training. Second is to simplify plans and processes. Third is to eliminate defects that come in and those we build. And fourth, increase our safety and quality,” Lund said.
What caused the door plug on Alaska Air's B737-9 MAX plane to burst just minutes after takeoff from Portland on January 5:
“A defective, non-conforming rivet came in from our supplier that did not pose a safety hazard in itself, but needed to be fixed. The aircraft then moved around the factory. While we discussed back and forth with our supplier, it went to the end of the (FLA) line. By the time we all agreed that the rivets needed to be removed and replaced, our procedure was no longer compliant,” Lund said.
That plug was opened “without the correct documents and paperwork.” Boeing has a “loop crew” that buttons up aircraft for weather when they leave the factory. “In this case, they closed the plug. They did not reinstall the retaining pin. That’s not their job. Their job is to just close it and they rely on the existing paperwork… The last step is what we call a fix to close. The plug was a little loose fit. That’s how it was able to fly for about 150 cycles (before the blowout occurred)… A defect from our supply chain entered our system that spread to our final assembly. And then there was a lack of compliance with our procedures,” Lund said.
Boeing has faced the ire of US regulatory agencies for speaking out about this ongoing investigation.
The reporter was in Seattle at the invitation of Boeing.